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This paper estimates transition matrices for the ratings on financial institutions, 
using an unusually informative data set. We show that the process of rating migration 
exhibits significant non-Markovian behavior, in the sense that the transition 
intensities are affected by macroeconomic and bank-specific variables. We illustrate 
how the use of a continuous time framework may improve the estimation of the 
transition probabilities. However, the time homogeneity assumption, frequently 
done in economic applications, does not hold, even for short time intervals. Thus, 
the information provided by migrations alone is not enough to forecast the future 
behavior of ratings. The stage of the business cycle should be taken into account, 
and individual characteristics of banks must be considered as well.
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1.  Introduction
External ratings provide important information for managers, investors 
and supervisors about a firm’s default risk. They summarize the firm’s overall 
financial health by placing it into a specific category according to the perception 
of the risk of default, and therefore complement the information available through 
financial markets. In emerging market economies, where financial markets are not 34 Cuadernos de Economía Vol. 46 (Mayo) 2009
well developed, external ratings constitute a fundamental piece of information in 
the process of investment allocation. It is a regular practice for firms to pay a fee 
to rating companies in order to receive a grading, which will be used by investors 
(and also by supervisors) to make decisions that will affect the firm’s future.
In the Basel Accord (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2004), 
external ratings promote market discipline in the financial intermediation industry, 
in the sense that by signaling a bank’s default probability to other economic agents, 
ratings give the bank incentives to adopt more conservative risk taking policies. 
If ratings are accurate, and therefore reflect closely the default probability of an 
institution, a bank taking higher risks is more likely to be downgraded, because 
higher risks imply a greater default probability. Therefore, the rating will provide 
a signal to investors and supervisors, and banks will be more inclined toward 
sound financial practices.
In order to be accurate, rating agencies need to have an adequate knowledge 
of the firm and the environment in which it operates. When issuing a credit rating, 
rating agencies use qualitative and quantitative information obtained both from 
public and private sources (see, for instance, Grey et al., 2006). Several studies 
have argued that the methodologies used by international rating agencies such as 
Standard & Poor’s and Moody’s to evaluate the risk of default of firms on emerg-
ing market economies are not completely adequate, in the sense that in order to 
provide “uniformity” in the rating policies across countries they sacrifice preci-
sion, because they do not take into account idiosyncratic effects properly (see, for 
instance, Rojas-Suarez,2001 and Ferri and Liu, 2003). Those studies argue that 
there exist a high positive correlation between the grade given to sovereign debt of 
a developing country and the grading received by firms in that country, which does 
not appear in the case of developed economies. Therefore, in the case of emerging 
economies, although ratings from international agencies are important because they 
provide foreign investors information about domestic firms, alternative external 
ratings by domestic agencies provides important complementary information for 
decision makers. These complementary external ratings are particularly important 
for financial firms’ supervisors, who benefit from tools that provide a signal about 
possible threats to the stability of the financial system.
Rating transition matrices are at the core of risk modeling and are a standard 
starting point for risk dynamics. In their application to banks, migration matrices 
are particularly attractive for supervisors in the sense that they are in the set of 
available early warning tools. The main objective is to use current ratings and 
the past history of rating migrations to predict future downgrades and defaults. 
Usually, transition dynamics are analyzed using Markov chains. In many important 
economic applications (e.g. J.P. Morgan’s Credit Metrics), transition matrices are 
estimated in a discrete-time setting using a cohort method under the assumption 
of time-homogeneity; in a discrete and finite space setting, the probability of 
migrating from state i to state j is estimated by dividing the number of observed 
migrations from i to j in a given time period by the total number of firms in state i 
at the beginning of the period. One implication of this cohort method is that if no 
firm migrates from state i to j during the observation period, the estimate of the Evidence of Non-Markovian Behavior in the Process of Bank 35
corresponding probability is zero. This is a not desirable feature, especially when 
dealing with the estimation of rare event probabilities which, in case of occurring, 
may have a deep impact.
Various studies have proposed using continuous time methodologies as an 
alternative to the cohort approach, which not only overcomes the problem of the 
zero estimates for rare event probabilities, but also offer additional advantages 
such as allowing simple tests for non-Markovian behavior. Lando and Skodeberg 
(2002) present the way of estimating transition probabilities in a continuous time 
framework, both with and without the assumption of time homogeneity. With 
a data set covering several years of rating history of Standard and Poor’s, and 
using survival analysis techniques, they study two deviations from the Markov 
assumption: the dependence on previous rating, and waiting time effects, and find 
evidence that supports the hypothesis of non-Markovian behavior of migration 
dynamics. Other studies have reported different types of non-Markovian behavior. 
For instance, Kavvathas (2000) finds dependence of rating migrations on macro-
economic variables, while Jonker (2002), using a data set of ratings of banks in 
Europe, USA and Japan, finds that the country of origin of the bank matters in 
the downgrading process.
The question is not whether the ratings are in fact Markovian. With an 
absorbing state of default the Markovian assumption essentially implies all assets 
will eventually default. The question is rather whether the Markovian specification, 
which provides simplicity, is adequate, and if so on what time scale.
This study contributes to the literature on rating transition dynamics by 
presenting evidence of non-Markovian behavior in the process of rating transi-
tion, using a rich data set on ratings of financial institutions in Colombia. Using 
monthly data1 covering the period December 1996 to November 2005, we find 
that macroeconomic variables, as well as bank specific variables (summarized in 
the capitalization ratio) affect significantly the probability of migrating from one 
rating category to another. The paper shows how moving from a discrete time to a 
continuous time framework improves the estimation of transition probabilities in 
the sense that the number of zero estimates is reduced, but still non-homogeneities 
remain. By introducing macroeconomic variables using survival analysis techniques 
we show that upgrades are procyclical while downgradings are countercyclical. 
This fact, together with evidence on the influence of bank specific factors on 
the migration process indicates that a simple Markov chain is not adequate for 
explaining the bank rating migration process in Colombia.
The dataset used in this paper is unique, in the sense that in contrast with 
traditional datasets from external rating agencies in which the frequency of the data 
is annual, the frequency of the data used here for estimation is monthly. This allows 
identifying with more precision the moment in which a transition occurs, and also 
increases the number of observed transitions, which allows a finer estimation of 
1 As a robustness test of our results, we performed estimations using quarterly data. The results did 
not change significantly. In this paper we present results using monthly data, which is the frequency 
with which financial institutions are graded at the Central Bank of Colombia.36 Cuadernos de Economía Vol. 46 (Mayo) 2009
migration probabilities. We expect that our qualitative results hold more generally. 
Certainly this is worth investigating as other data become available.
Section 2 describes the data. Section 3 presents the estimation of a Markov 
chain using the data, both under a discrete time and a continuous time framework. 
It shows how the results differ whether estimation is done assuming time homo-
geneity or without that assumption. Section 4 presents the results of tests for the 
dependence of rating migration on macroeconomic and bank specific variables, 
and Section 5 presents conclusions.
2.  Description of the data
In 1994, the Department of Financial Stability (DFS) of the Banco de la 
República (the Central Bank of Colombia) began grading financial institutions 
in Colombia. Based on financial indicators derived from their balance sheets and 
on expert opinion, each institution is rated into one of four non-default catego-
ries, denoted I, II, III and IV. Category I corresponds to the highest rating, while 
category IV corresponds to the lowest one. All institutions that are in operation 
at the moment in which the rating is done are rated. During the first two years, 
ratings were computed only once a year. However, since December 1996 the DFS 
decided to produce monthly ratings in order to have a tool to evaluate frequently 
potential risks to the soundness of the financial system in Colombia. Several differ-
ent financial indicators are taken into account in the grading process. Taking into 
account these indicators and also considering expert opinion, a number is given 
to each bank. Then, the number is compared to predetermined threshold values, 
and each bank is assigned to one of the four categories.
Because few institutions were ever rated I, categories I and II were combined. 
The new categories are denoted A, B, C and the default category is D.
In this study, we consider all ratings of commercial banks and financial 
companies2, from December 1996 to November 2005. Table 1 presents a summary 
of the data, showing the number of financial institutions at the beginning and the 
end of the observation period, as well as the number of transitions observed among 
the different categories.
The reduction in the number of institutions during the observation period 
obeys to consequences of the financial crisis that took place during the late 1990s, 
leading to several bank failures, and to mergers and acquisitions (for details on 
the effects of the crisis on bank failure see Gomez-Gonzalez and Kiefer, 2006). 
Regarding the fraction of average annual transitions, Table 1 shows that better 
rated institutions are more likely to remain in the same category. For instance, on 
average 72% of institutions rated A at the beginning of a year are rated A at the 
2 Financial companies specialized in commercial leasing are not included, because they are quite dif-
ferent, in the sense that they have different purposes than the other intermediaries mentioned before, 
and their activities and portfolio composition are also very different. Therefore, for the purpose of this 
paper, data are collected only from commercial banks and financial companies.Evidence of Non-Markovian Behavior in the Process of Bank 37
end of the year, while only 56% of those rated B at the beginning of a year are 
in the same rating at the end of the year. Migrations outside of a given category 
concentrate on neighbor categories. For example, migrations from A to B are 
more frequent than migrations from A to C or D. It is important to keep in mind 
that Table 1 considers annual migrations only, i.e. changes in rating comparing 
December of a given year with December of the next year. Therefore, it does not 
take into account migrations occurring within the year3. For example, a bank rated 
C in December 1996 that was rated B in June 1997 but went back to category C 
in December 1997 will be considered as a transition from C to C. Therefore, the 
diagonal elements of this matrix tend to be higher than those of a transition matrix 
that considers transitions within the year.
3.  Markov chain estimation
Markov chains are widely used to estimate migration probabilities. This 
section shows the results of estimating the probabilities of bank rating transitions 
assuming that the stochastic process underlying the observed migration dynam-
ics can be represented adequately by a Markov chain. We present the results of 
estimations in a discrete time setting and in a continuous time setting. Within each 
of these two settings, we present results when time-homogeneity is assumed, and 
when such assumption is not made.
3 Table 1 was constructed this way to allow comparisons with the transition matrices provided by 
rating agencies like Standard and Poor’s and Moody’s.
TABLE 1






December 1996 42 57 99
November 2005 29 21 50
Average annual transitions among categories 1996:12 –2004:12
A B C D
A 0.7158 0.2216 0.0537 0.0089
B 0.2659 0.5630 0.1439 0.0272
C 0.0218 0.2958 0.3956 0.2868
Source: Department of Financial Stability of the Banco de la República.38 Cuadernos de Economía Vol. 46 (Mayo) 2009
3.1  Estimation of discrete time Markov chains
Suppose we have a sample of N banks, which are observed during T+1 
(discrete) periods of time. At every moment of time, each bank is given a particular 
rating. The number of ratings is finite, and transitions from one rating to another, 
which are assumed to be independent across banks, are observed. Let 
 
nt i() 
denote the number of banks in category i at time t, and nt ij() the number of banks 
migrating from category i to j between dates t–1 and t. The total number of banks 
exposed to migration from category i, during the whole period of observation, is 




1 , while the total number of transitions from rating i to 





. The rating of the bank in the first period of time 
observed (t = 0) is given.
If time-homogeneity is assumed, then  pt p ij ij ()=  for all t, and the log-
likelihood function is given by











 which indicates that every bank is rated in exactly one of the S possible 
categories at every date, we get the maximum likelihood estimator for the probability 










If the time-homogeneity assumption is removed, the maximum likelihood 










Although time-homogeneity has the inconvenience that it is hard to justify 
for long periods of time, it is a very convenient assumption, especially for forecast 
purposes, and therefore many Markov chain applications rely on this assumption. In 
credit rating applications, it is frequently assumed that the process can be represented 
by a discrete time-homogeneous Markov chain for a one year period. Using our 
dataset, we performed a likelihood-ratio test, to check whether the hypothesis of 
time-homogeneity in a discrete time setup is adequate. Suppose we are interested 
in testing whether the i–th rows of the transition matrix for different periods are 


























is a  χ
2
 random variable with (S–1)x(T´–t´) degrees of freedom (see Thomas, 
Edelman and Crook, 2002)4.
We performed tests of the time-homogeneity assumption for different time 
periods, using a roll over technique. To avoid problems with zeros in the division 
or log(0), we bounded each transition probability below by 10–7. This appears to 
be a sufficiently low bound to avoid changing the results of the test, and trying 
different bounds did not change the results significantly. We performed this test 
for different periodicity, ranging from four months to two years, using a roll over 
technique. We calculated the χ
2 statistic, together with the corresponding p-value, 
and found that the hypothesis of time-homogeneity can be rejected at very low 
significance levels (even for four months, in most cases). In all cases the null 
hypothesis can be rejected at the 5 percent level for eleven months or more.
These results provide strong evidence that the rating migration process 
underlying our data set is not time-homogeneous. In fact, misleading conclusions 
can be derived from imposing this assumption on the data.
We now turn to continuous-time estimation, avoiding the awkward question 
of the definition of the period5.
3.2  Estimation of continuous time Markov chains
External rating systems may have trouble when estimating continuous time 
Markov chains using migrations data, if they do not have sufficiently frequent 
information to update the rating of a firm as soon as a change occurs that takes the 
firm to a different risk profile. Internal rating systems do not have this problem, 
because they have the required information at every moment of time; particularly, 
with internal information the exact moment at which a transition occurs can be 
recorded. Our data is somewhere in between. We do not have information about 
the exact moment in which the migration occurred, but we have a good approxi-
mation to it due to the relatively high frequency of the data; the fact that we have 
ratings available on a monthly basis allows us to estimate continuous time Markov 
chains for different time periods.
4 A likelihood ratio test for the assumption of time homogeneity when data are not observed in regular 
intervals is developed in Kiefer and Larson (2008).
5 One important advantage of continuous time estimation is that it avoids the problem of defining the 
period: should data be observed monthly, quarterly, annually? Does the frequency with which data is 
observed correspond to the frequency with which transitions occur?40 Cuadernos de Economía Vol. 46 (Mayo) 2009
Estimation under time-homogeneity assumption
A starting point for estimating continuous time Markov chains is the as-
sumption of time-homogeneity. Above we showed that this assumption does not 
seem adequate in the discrete-time specification and therefore is unlikely to hold 
in continuous time; however, it provides a good starting point, a benchmark to 
compare the results obtained when this assumption is removed, and when covari-
ates are included in the estimation.
Suppose we observe the ratings of N banks between time 0 and time T. 
Assume that the state space is finite, being one the highest category and S the 
lowest one. For a given time period, let P(t) be the transition matrix. This matrix 
can be expressed in terms of transition intensities, which appears to be a more 
natural way to formulate statistical hypotheses (Lando, 2004), by noting that
(5)  Pt t () exp, = ( ) ≥ Λ t0
where  Λ  represents the generator matrix. Given that for any t, the transition 
matrix is a function of the generator matrix, we can obtain maximum likelihood 
estimates of the elements of the transition matrix by obtaining first maximum 
likelihood estimators of the elements of the generator matrix, and then applying 
the exponential matrix function to this estimates, after scaling appropriately by t. 
The elements of the generator matrix are the transition intensities, whose maximum 













where Ys i()  is the number of banks rated i at time s. The diagonal elements are 
ˆ ˆ λ λ ii ij
ij
=−
≠ ∑ . The key point here is that the denominator takes into account every 
bank that has been rated i during some time during the observation period. Therefore, 
this method uses information differently than the cohort method.
The advantage of this method is that it takes into account not only direct 
transitions from one rating class to another, but also “indirect” transitions. In par-
ticular, the estimation of a transition will be strictly positive if during the observation 
period there was a sequence of migrations between intermediate rating classes, even 
if there is no single bank that experienced all those migrations. For example, if we 
are interested in estimating the probability of a rare event, say the one year transition 
from category A to default, but no bank experienced this transition directly, we can 
still obtain a positive estimate if there was at least one bank which migrated from 
A to B, at least one which migrated from B to C, and at least one which migrated 
from C to default, even if the migrating banks are different, during the observation 
period. Using our dataset we still had some zero estimates for some probabilities in 
some time intervals, because some periods of time presented very few transitions.Evidence of Non-Markovian Behavior in the Process of Bank 41
For illustration purposes only, we present the average one year transition 





0 5353 0 3291 0 1117 0 0238



















Note that all probabilities are strictly positive, except for transitions out of 
default, which is assumed to be an absorbing state.
One may be tempted to assume that rating dynamics can be modeled 
adequately by using a continuous time homogeneous Markov chain. This would 
indeed be very conveniently, as using current data one could calculate the aggre-
gate number of transitions between any two categories; this would in turn be very 
useful for supervisors. However, using a rollover estimation technique, it is clear 
that non homogeneities appear. Figures 1, 2 and 3 show time series for one year 










































































































































A to B A to default A to B
FIGURE 1
TRANSITIONS OUT OF CATEGORY A
12-month intensities (monthly data; time homogeneity)42 Cuadernos de Economía Vol. 46 (Mayo) 2009
FIGURE 2
TRANSITIONS OUT OF CATEGORY B
12-month intensities (monthly data; time homogeneity)
FIGURE 3
TRANSITIONS OUT OF CATEGORY C




























































































































































































































































































































C to B C to A C to defaultEvidence of Non-Markovian Behavior in the Process of Bank 43
the time homogeneity assumption. From these figures it can be seen clearly that 
transition intensities vary a lot in time. This holds true when the estimation period 
of the Markov chains is modified. Therefore, even though it would be useful to 
assume time homogeneity in rating migrations estimation, this assumption does 
not seem to be adequate.
Estimation without imposing the time homogeneity assumption
An alternative non-parametric method exists to estimate continuous time 
Markov chains without assuming time homogeneity. The method is based in the 
Aalen-Johansen estimator (for a discussion see Lando and Skodeberg (2002)). 
Suppose m transitions are observed during a period of time s. The transition matrix, 
P(s), is consistently estimated by
(7)  ˆ() ˆ Ps IA Ti i
m
=+ ( ) ( ) = ∏ ∆
1
where I is the identity matrix and Ti  is a jump time occurring in the observation 
period; ∆ˆ AT i ( ) is a matrix in which the non-diagonal entry ij is given by the ratio 
of the number of transitions observed from state i to state j at date Ti  and the total 
number of banks in state i at the instant right before the time of the jump. The 
diagonal entries are given by the negative of the summation of the non-diagonal 
entries of the row, so each row in the matrix adds up to zero. The last row of this 
matrix is a zero vector, as there are no transitions out of default. As it can be seen, 
this method also allows censoring properly.
The average one year continuous time transition matrix estimated without 
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Note that the average one year continuous time transition matrix estimated 
without using the time homogeneity assumption looks similar to the one estimated 
under the time homogeneity assumption. Therefore, if the rollover method were 
not used, one may be tempted to conclude that the homogeneity assumption seems 
appropriate. However, as it was discussed above, the huge variations over time 
of the transition matrix estimated under the time homogeneity assumption show 
clearly that this assumption is not adequate in this context.44 Cuadernos de Economía Vol. 46 (Mayo) 2009
4.  Introducing covariates to explain migration 
dynamics
Above we showed that rating dynamics vary over time. It is not clear why. 
Different studies have shown that different covariates influence significantly the 
transition probabilities. Jonker (2002), using a data set of ratings of banks in 
Europe, USA and Japan, finds that the country of origin of the bank matters in the 
downgrading process. Bangia et al. (2002), using data from the Standard & Poor’s 
CreditPro 3.0 database, show that the business cycle influences significantly credit 
migration matrices, by separating the economy into two states (contraction and 
expansion) and computing transition matrices for these states separately. Lando 
and Skodeberg (2002), and Kavvathas (2000) use survival analysis techniques 
to show the influence of migration matrices on previous rating and waiting time 
effects, and on macroeconomic variables, respectively.
This study introduces macroeconomic variables and bank specific vari-
ables (summarized by the capitalization ratio) to explain bank rating dynamics. 
Covariates are introduced using survival analysis techniques, which appears to be 
a very convenient way of doing so –for an introduction to these methods in general 
see Klein and Moeschberger (2003), and for an introduction to the application of 
these methods in economics see Kiefer (1988)–, because censoring is handled, 
and the time a bank spends in a given category provides useful information for 
estimating the transition probabilities.
Given the frequency of the data, the set of macroeconomic variables that 
can be used effectively is limited6. Two different macroeconomic variables were 
used: the monthly average interest rate on loans (RIR), computed by the Banco 
de la República, and the real production index (RPI) provided by the Department 
of National Statistics of Colombia (DANE). Monthly information for these two 
variables was collected from November 1996 to November 2005. Both macro-
economic variables are included in the regressions with one lag. Additionally, the 
capitalization ratio (CAP), given by the ratio of equity and assets, was used as a 
proxy for the financial institutions’ overall financial health. Although other financial 
variables are also important bank specific indicators, CAP is a special indicator 
determining the probability of bank failure in Colombia (see Gomez-Gonzalez and 
Kiefer, 2006), and therefore it seems to be a variable which summarizes compactly 
the overall financial performance of a bank7.
Let  λij
n t () denote the transition intensity from category i to category j of 
bank n. Then,







n tY tt Xt () ,, = ( ) ( ) ( )
6 We expect that one or two variables would be enough to capture the major macroeconomic effects. 
Recall that the theoretical model underlying the Basel II regulation is a single-factor model.
7 Following a useful comment of an anonymous referee, we also ran regressions using the Basel 
capital adequacy ratio replacing CAP. The results we obtained were essentially the same. We only 
report results using CAP as the proxy for overall financial health in this study.Evidence of Non-Markovian Behavior in the Process of Bank 45
where Yt i
n ( )  is an indicator function which takes the value one if the firm is rated 
in category i at time t and cero otherwise; αβ ij
n
ij
n tX t ,, ( ) ( ) is a function both of time 
and of a vector of covariates of bank n at time t, denoted Xt
n ( ). In this study, we 
use time varying covariates; however, if time varying covariates are not available or 
if the covariates to be included do not vary during the observation period, a vector 
of fixed covariates can be used. It is assumed that the function αβ ij
n
ij
n tX t ,, ( ) ( ) has 
the multiplicative (proportional hazards) form, as in Cox (1972):





n tX tt Xt ,, () , ( ) ( ) = ( ) ( )
0
where αij t
0()  represents the baseline intensity, common to all banks, which captures the 
direct effect of time on the transition intensity. For estimation purposes, a functional 
form is specified for φβ ij
n Xt , ( ) ( ), while the baseline intensity is let unspecified (the 
only restriction is that it is non-negative). A functional form which is frequently 
chosen for  φ ... ( )  is an exponential form, φβ β ij
n
ij
n Xt Xt , e xp , ( ) ( ) = ( ) ( ) which has 
the advantage of guaranteeing non-negativity without imposing any restrictions 
on the values of the parameters of interest (βij ′s). The model is estimated by the 
method of partial likelihood estimation, developed by Cox (1972).
Tables 2 to 4 present the results of the estimation when only macroeconomic 
variables are included as covariates. Note that RIR affects significantly all transition 
intensities, except for that from category C to default. The sign of the coefficient 
corresponding to this covariate is the expected one in all regressions in which it is 
significant: when the transition implies a downgrading, the sign of RIR is positive, 
indicating that increases in the real interest rate lead to increases in the probability 
of a downgrading. When the transition implies an upgrading, the sign of RIR is 
negative, indicating that increases in the real interest rate lead to decreases in the 
probability of an upgrading. Taking into account that the interest rate is counter-
cyclical, this implies that migrations depend on the business cycle.
Meanwhile, the impact of the RPI on the transition intensities is non-
significantly different from zero in most of the cases (at a 5 percent level of 
significance). However, the sign of the coefficient corresponding to this variable 
is always the expected one: positive when the transition implies an upgrading and 
negative when the transition implies a downgrading. Additionally, RPI and RIR 
are jointly significant at the 5 percent level in all regressions except on those from 
category A to category B (they are significant at the 10 percent level in this case) 
and from category C to default.
It is interesting to note that, contrary to what occurs with all other transi-
tions, no macroeconomic variable is significant in explaining migrations from 
category C to default. A possible reason is that few transitions from C to default 
are observed (relative to the number of banks exposed in category C).
Note RIR is a better explanatory variable than RPI in terms of fit and when 
both are included RPI is typically insignificant.46 Cuadernos de Economía Vol. 46 (Mayo) 2009
TABLE 2
TRANSITIONS AWAY FROM CATEGORY A
TRANSITION FROM A TO B
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Covariate Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient.
RIR       0.0348*
     (0.0147)
      0.0363*
     (0.0147)
RPI     –0.0002
     (0.0106)
      0.0053
     (0.0109)
Log-likel. –596.91 –599.58 –596.79
LR χ2 (d.f.)       5.34 (1)       0.00 (1)       5.57 (2)
Prob > χ2        0.0209       0.9840       0.0616
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, *significant at the 5% level.
TABLE 3
TRANSITIONS AWAY FROM CATEGORY B
TRANSITION FROM A TO B
TRANSITION FROM A TO B TRANSITION FROM B TO C
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Covariate Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient. Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
RIR      –0.0448
     (0.0163)
     –0.0427
     (0.0164)
       0.0730*
     (0.0120)
       0.0719*
     (0.0121)
RPI       0.0187
     (0.0108)
      0.0158
     (0.0110)
    –0.0210*
     (0.0104)
     –0.0163
     (0.0103)
Log-likel. –683.09 –685.74 –682.04 –703.79 –718.98 –702.55
LR χ2 (d.f.)       8.32 (1)       3.03 (1)     10.42 (2)     34.41 (1)       4.05 (1)     36.90 (2)
Prob > χ2       0.0039       0.0820       0.0055       0.0000       0.0442       0.0000
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, *significant at the 5% level.
Tables 5 to 7 present the results of the estimation when the capitalization 
ratio is included as a covariate. Two different models are presented for each rating 
migration: one in which CAP is the only covariate included, and another in which 
CAP and RIR are included. It is interesting to note that, similar to the case in 
which only macro variables were included, neither CAP nor RIR appear to affect 
significantly the transition intensity from category C to default. This can probably 
be explained by the low proportion of defaults out of bank exposures in category C, 
together with the fact that banks that spend a long time in category C are already 
in bad financial health, independently on whether they default or not.Evidence of Non-Markovian Behavior in the Process of Bank 47
Another important feature is that in all other regressions the two covari-
ates included result jointly significant at the 5 percent level. The signs of the 
coefficients of these two variables are the expected in all cases (the coefficient of 
CAP is positive when the transition implies an upgrading and negative when the 
transition implies a downgrading, while the coefficient of RIR is negative when 
the transition implies an upgrading and negative when the transition implies a 
downgrading), except for the sign of CAP in the migration from A to B, which is 
the opposite to the expected one.
TABLE 4
TRANSITIONS AWAY FROM CATEGORY C
TRANSITION FROM C TO B TRANSITIONS FROM C TO DEFAULT
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Covariate Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
RIR      –0.0331*
     (0.0149)
     –0.0330*
     (0.0149)
   –0.0503
   (0.0352)
   –0.0198
   (0.0243)
   –0.0532
   (0.0356)
RPI       0.0055
     (0.0102)
      0.0053
     (0.0103)
   –0.0199
   (0.0243)
Log–likel. –585.10 –587.53 –584.96 –97.34 –98.18 –97.00
LR χ2 (d.f.)       5.16 (1)       0.29 (1)       5.43 (2)     2.16 (1)     0.48 (1)     2.84 (2)
Prob > χ2       0.0231       0.5879       0.0662     0.1416     0.4874     0.2419
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, *significant at the 5% level.
TABLE 5
TRANSITIONS AWAY FROM CATEGORY A
TRANSITION FROM A TO B
Model 1 Model 2
Covariate Coefficient Coefficient
CAP             0.0068
           (0.0052)
            0.0065
           (0.0052)
RIR             0.0349*
           (0.0146)
Log-likel.       –595.07       –592.42
LR χ2 (d.f.)             1.56 (1)             6.84 (2)
Prob > χ2              0.2115             0.0327
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, *significant at the 5% level.48 Cuadernos de Economía Vol. 46 (Mayo) 2009
TABLE 6
TRANSITIONS AWAY FROM CATEGORY B
TRANSITION FROM B TO A TRANSITION FROM B TO C
Model 1 Model 1 Model 2
Covariate Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
CAP       0.0086
     (0.0050)
     –0.0108
      (0.0074)
     –0.0158*
      (0.0079)
RIR       0.0771
     (0.121)
Log-likel. –685.64 –708.19 –689.34
LR χ2 (d.f.)       2.55 (1)       2.45 (1)      40.14 (2)
Prob > χ2        0.1104       0.1177       0.0000
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, *significant at the 5% level.
TABLE 7
TRANSITIONS AWAY FROM CATEGORY C
TRANSITION FROM C TO B TRANSITION FROM C TO DEFAULT
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
Covariate Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
CAP       0.0054
     (0.0069)
      0.0054
     (0.0069)
     0.0192
    (0.0148)
    0.0191
   (0.0148)
RPI      –0.0334*
     (0.0148)
  –0.0502
   (0.0350)
Log-likel. –587.24 –584.60 –97.71 –96.62
LR χ2 (d.f.)       0.57 (1)       5.85 (2)     1.39 (1)     3.57 (2)
Prob > χ2        0.4499       0.0537     0.2385     0.1675
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, *significant at the 5% level.
Altogether, the results of the regressions indicate that the process of rating 
dynamics depends on external covariates related to the business cycle and on 
bank specific ratios. This provides evidence that supports the idea that a simple 
Markov model is not adequate to represent this process. The evidence reported 
here complements evidence of non-Markovian behavior on rating migrations 
reported in other studies that use datasets with different time scales, and test for 
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Conclusions
This paper estimates transition matrices for the ratings on financial in-
stitutions in Colombia. Using an unusually informative data set, we show that 
the process of rating migration exhibits significant non-Markovian behavior, 
in the sense that the transition intensities are affected by macroeconomic and 
bank specific variables. The monthly real interest rate influences significantly 
all transition migrations to neighboring ratings, except for the migration from 
category C to default. The same conclusion holds when the capitalization ratio 
in included in the regression.
The use of a continuous time framework may improve the estimation of 
the transition probabilities, in the sense that problems related to zero probability 
estimates of rare events can be avoided, but, as well as in other studies, this study 
finds that the time homogeneity assumption, commonly assumed in important 
economic applications, does not hold, not even for short periods of time. Therefore, 
the information provided by migrations alone is not enough to forecast the future 
behavior of ratings. The stage of the business cycle should be taken into account, 
and individual characteristics of banks must be considered as well.
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